Using computer simulations based on three separate data generating processes, I estimate the fraction of elections in which sincere voting will be a core equilibrium given each of eight single-winner voting rules. Additionally, I determine how often each voting rule is vulnerable to simple voting strategies such as ‗burying' and ‗compromising', and how often each voting rule gives an incentive for non-winning candidates to enter or leave races. I find that Hare is least vulnerable to strategic voting in general, whereas Borda, Coombs, approval, and range are most vulnerable. I find that plurality is most vulnerable to compromising and strategic exit (which can both reinforce two-party systems), and that Borda is most vulnerable to strategic entry. I support my key results with analytical proofs.
Introduction
For many who seek to improve the political process, alternative voting rules offer the possibility of transformative change; however, there is no consensus on which rule is best. When evaluating these systems, we must consider the extent to which they will encourage strategic behavior. I distinguish between two basic types of election strategy: The first is strategic voting, which means voters reporting preferences that differ from their sincere appraisal of the candidates. The second is strategic nomination, which means non-winning candidates attempting to change the result by entering or exiting races.
Since Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) demonstrated that all reasonable voting rules create incentives for strategic voting in at least some situations, 1 several authors have attempted to assess the degree to which different voting rules are susceptible to manipulation. There is no universally accepted way to measure this vulnerability, but one of the most common approaches has been to estimate the fraction of elections in which manipulation is logically possible, given some assumption about the distribution function that governs voters' preferences over candidates. Some papers are concerned with the probability that an individual voter will be able to change the result to his own benefit by voting insincerely, 2 while others are concerned with the probability that a 1 Specifically, if there are more than two candidates for a single office, and a non-dictatorial election method allows voters to rank the candidates in any order, then there must be some profile of voter preferences under which at least one voter can get a preferred result by voting insincerely. This well-known ‗Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem' relies in turn on the even more well-known ‗Arrow theorem'-for this, see Arrow (1951 Arrow ( , rev. ed. 1963 . 2 For example, Nitzan (1985) , Kelley (1993) , Smith (1999) , and Aleskerov and Kurbanov (1999) . Saari (1990) focuses on ‗micro manipulations', i.e. strategic incursions by groups of arbitrarily small size. coalition of voters will be able to change the result to all of its members' mutual benefit by voting insincerely, 3 and still others are concerned with both. 4 Here, I focus on coalitional manipulation.
In this paper, I extend the literature in at least five ways. First, I produce separate results for each of two distinct types of strategic voting -‗compromising' and ‗burying'which have different implications for political behavior, and I show the effect of limiting voters to a ‗simple' strategy that combines these. Second, I extend the methodology of the strategic voting literature to the phenomenon of strategic nomination, thus permitting a more holistic understanding of the types of strategic behavior that each voting rule encourages. Third, whereas most papers that give numerical estimates of voting rules' vulnerability to coalitional manipulation are limited to a fixed number of candidates, 5 this paper presents algorithms that can generate estimates for any number of candidates. It is not practical to solve this problem using brute force, so I create a fundamentally distinct algorithm for each voting rule, based on the logical conditions that determine whether manipulation is possible. Fourth, whereas most papers in the literature have based their results on the assumption of a single data generating process, 6 I perform each of my strategic voting analyses three times: once with a spatial model, once with an impartial culture model, and once using survey responses from the American National Election Studies. With the latter, I bring some real preferences of citizens over politicians into a literature that has mostly used relatively stylized models of voter preferences. By performing the same analyses with multiple data generating processes, I'm able to make distinctions between artifacts of particular specifications, and more general patterns. Fifth, I introduce a number of original analytical results concerning burying, compromising, strategic voting given ‗almost-symmetrical preferences', core equilibrium existence in voting, and strategic nomination. I focus on eight relatively well-known single-winner voting rules that I consider to be broadly representative of single-winner rules in general: these are plurality, runoff, Hare, minimax, Borda, Coombs, range voting, and approval voting.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section two, I define the voting rules and the types of strategic behavior that the paper focuses on, and briefly discuss the strategic incentives created by the plurality system, relative to those created by other single-winner systems. In section three, I describe the models and data that I use to generate elections. In sections four and five, I describe how the voting and nomination strategy simulations are constructed, and in sections six and seven, I present the results. In section eight, I present analytical results that complement the simulation results. In section nine, I conclude.
Preliminary definitions
Notation: Let be the number of candidates, and be the number of voters. Let , , and serve as candidate indexes, and let serve as a voter index. Let denote the winning candidate. Let be the ranking that voter gives to candidate (such that lower-numbered rankings are better), and let be the utility that voter gets if candidate is elected. Let indicate that is ranked ahead of , or preferred to , depending on context; likewise, let indicate that is given the same ranking as , or that a voter is indifferent between and . Let be a tiebreaking vector that gives a unique fractional score to each candidate, and let be a vector of candidate eliminations, such that is initially set to zero for each candidate . him in any pairwise comparison, and the candidate who receives the lowest score is the winner. 9 This system is the application to the single-winner case of proportional representation by the single transferable vote, which is often named for Thomas Hare because he was highly influential in its development. See Hoag and Hallett (1926, 162-95) . 10 Center for Voting and Democracy, http://www.fairvote.org/where-instant-runoff-voting-has-been-adopted 11 -Referendum on voting system goes ahead after Lords vote.‖ BBC News, February 17, 2011. 12 See Coombs (1964) . 13 Black (1958) , page 175, develops the minimax method as a possible interpretation of Condorcet's intended proposal. Levin and Nalebuff (1995) label this method as the -Simpson-Kramer min-max rule‖; presumably the reference is to Simpson (1969) and Kramer (1977) . Nurmi (1999) 
Range voting:
Each voter may give each candidate any real number of points within a specified range (e.g. 0 to 1 or 0 to 100). The winner is the candidate with the most points.
Strategy definitions
In the case of ranking-based methods, strategic voting means providing a ranking of the candidates that differs from one's true preference ordering, for example, my voting when my sincere preference ordering is . In the case of plurality, it means voting for a candidate other than one's sincere favorite, and in the case of approval voting or range voting, it means departing from one's sincere cardinal ratings of the candidates.
Two subsidiary types of strategic voting that will provide important analytical distinctions are the ‗compromising' and ‗burying' strategies. 17 The compromising strategy entails voters improving the ranking or rating of a candidate, in order to cause that candidate to win. For example, a voter with sincere preferences could compromise in favor of by voting , or, in plurality, by simply voting for . The burying strategy entails voters worsening the ranking or rating of one candidate, in order to cause another candidate to win. For example, a voter with sincere preferences could bury (in order to help or ) by voting .
When citizens cast their votes in a plurality election for candidates they consider to be the ‗lesser of two evils', rather than for their sincere favorites, this is an example of the compromising strategy. For example, suppose that 49% of voters have the preference ordering , 24% of voters prefer , 24% of voters prefer , and 3% of voters prefer .
(This example may be more intuitive if one imagines that candidate is George W. Bush, candidate is Al Gore, and candidate is Ralph Nader.) If all voters vote for their sincere favorites, will win with 49% of the vote, but if the voters compromise by voting for candidate , will win with 51% of the vote.
To see an example of the burying strategy, suppose that voters have the same preferences as above, but that the election method is Borda or minimax instead of plurality. The sincere winner given either rule will be candidate , but if the voters all bury by voting , then will win.
Strategic nomination means non-winning candidates entering or leaving a race in order to change the outcome to one they prefer; I describe these as strategic entry and strategic exit, respectively. The custom of strategic nomination can be seen in the party primaries that are a regular feature of American democracy. That is, if two or more candidates with similar views run in the same plurality election, then the voters who support those views will be divided among them,
giving an advantage to other candidates with opposed views. Therefore, it is helpful for groups of fairly like-minded people to form some kind of associationthat is, a political partywhich fields only one candidate per election, and which provides some kind of process for deciding whom this one candidate should bethat is, a primary.
In this paper, I find that plurality has more frequent incentives for the compromising strategy, and for strategic exit, than any of the other voting rules that I analyze. Since strategic exit gives third party candidates a disincentive to run, and frequent use of the compromising strategy gives voters a disincentive to support third party candidates who do run, these phenomena together may provide much of the explanation for Duverger's Law, 18 which states that countries using the plurality voting rule will tend to have two dominant political parties. Therefore, switching to one of the alternative systems described here could decrease the extent to which a two party system prevails, and increase the competitiveness of elections.
However, I do not find that plurality is most vulnerable to strategic voting overall; instead, I find that the most vulnerable methods in my study are range voting, Coombs, approval voting, and
Borda. Although these methods create less frequent incentives for compromising, they create frequent incentives for burying, whereas plurality is immune to burying (as are two round runoff and Hare). 19 Also, I find that Borda, not plurality, gives the most frequent incentives for strategic entry. Whereas the effects of compromising and strategic exit are relatively well-understood by virtue of the long history of the plurality system, adopting a voting rule that creates frequent burying or strategic entry incentives would bring us into relatively unknown territory. questions, which ask respondents to rate particular politicians on a scale from 0 to 100. The list of politicians varies from year to year; current presidents and vice-presidents are always included, as are Democratic and Republican presidential and vice-presidential candidates, during presidential election years. In addition to this, there are various other figures who are included in the survey even when they don't hold any of these positions, for example Ted Kennedy (from 1970 to 1988), Ronald Reagan (from 1968 to 1990, and again in 2004) , Hillary Clinton, Ross Perot, and so on.
Models and data
Since the survey doesn't determine any actual electoral outcome, there is no obvious incentive for the respondents to report insincere ratings; thus it is not too much of a stretch to treat the thermometer ratings as the voters' sincere cardinal ratings of the candidates, and to use them to derive sincere ordinal preferences.
In some presidential election years, respondents are rating as many as 12 politicians; in others, as few as 7. For a given number of candidates C, I generate imaginary elections in each presidential election year, where is the number of politicians rated by survey respondents in year . (Thus, I explore all possible -candidate subsets of the rated politicians.) In each of these simulated elections, I treat each of the survey respondents as one voter; although the data set includes some weighting variables, I don't make use of them here. To get the score for each year , I find the fraction of these elections that are vulnerable to strategic manipulation. I then take the average over these yearly scores to get the overall score for the given value of .
Strategic voting simulation design

How often is sincere voting a core equilibrium? (analysis V1)
My primary approach to strategic voting is to ask how often sincere voting is a core equilibrium.
That is, I begin with sincere votes, and ask whether there is a group of voters who can change the winner to one whom they all prefer over the sincere winner, by changing their votes. If this is true for a given voting method, then the method is vulnerable to strategic manipulation in that example;
otherwise, sincere voting is a core equilibrium.
As it turns out, it is difficult to test for core equilibria in strategic voting using brute force. That is, for a ranking-based method, there are possible rankings of candidates, and thus ways in which voters can rank them. As for approval voting, there are possible voting profiles, or if we consider approving all and approving none as being equivalent, and as for plurality, there are functionally unique voting profiles. Thus, even with a fast computer, it can be a daunting task to search over every one of these ranking profiles to determine whether any of them
give an advantage to all of the voters whose votes differ from their sincere preferences. Therefore, I've written separate programs to determine whether each of the eight voting rules is vulnerable to manipulation. To give a sense of how these operate, I describe then briefly below. 20
In these descriptions, let indicate whether voter prefers candidatethe potential winner by strategyto the sincere winner , and let be the number of potential strategists. Also, let a tilde mark indicate a version of an existing variable that is altered by omitting these potential strategists; for example, . Let indicate that manipulation on behalf of candidate is feasible, and let indicate that it is not.
Plurality:
First, I calculate the sincere winner using the first choice votes vector , and I find the pairwise matrix , as described in subsections 2.1.1 and 2.1.5. Then, I loop through possible strategic challengers to determine whether would win if all the voters who prefer to voted for ; this is the necessary and sufficient condition for strategic incursion on behalf of to be possible. Formally, .
Approval voting:
In my simulations, I suppose that voters' sincere inclination is to approve candidates who give them greater than average utility. (In the spatial voting model, this means that they approve candidates who are closer to them than average.) Alternative assumptions are possible, but this seems as straightforward as any.
indicates whether voter approves of candidate , and gives the number of voters who approve of , plus a fractional tiebreaker. Strategic incursion is possible on behalf of a challenger candidate if and only if wins when all of the voters who prefer to vote to approve and no one else.
Formally, for each , I make the following calculations: .
.
Range voting:
I convert voter utilities into sincere ratings on the [0,1] interval, and sum them to find the sincere winner. Formally, , ,
, and . The program to detect manipulability is similar to the approval voting program. 20 More detailed descriptions, along with the codes themselves, are available from the author on request.
Two round runoff:
The sincere winner is determined by the following calculations:
. . . .
. .
To cause to win in the runoff system, strategists must cause the runoff to be between and some other candidate , whom can beat. Therefore, within the loop over , the program loops over , and determines whether (1) those who prefer to or to (or both) constitute a majority, enabling to win the runoff, and (2) the strategists can cause and to be the top two finishers in the first round. Strategic incursion is possible if and only if both of these conditions are true.
Formally, given that , the first condition is true if and only if . Given that , ,
, and , the second condition is true if and only if .
Hare:
The Hare program is somewhat similar to the two round runoff program, but more complex. To determine whether those who prefer a given candidate can change their votes so that is elected, I examine each of the elimination orders that result in 's victory, and determine whether the voters can cause any of them to occur. To determine whether an elimination order is feasible, I examine each of the rounds from , continuing as long as the strategists can cause the elimination of the candidate who is supposed to be eliminated in round , according to the given elimination order. In determining this, I need to keep track of votes that strategists must commit to particular candidates in order to ensure a given elimination, and bind them to these votes until the candidates are eliminated.
Coombs:
The structure of this program is similar to that of the Hare program, although it is somewhat less complex, because it doesn't need to keep track of strategists' commitments. That is, rather than adding first choice votes to candidates whom they want to survive, strategists are adding last choice votes to candidate whom they want to be eliminated; as long as this elimination is successful (which is necessary to the strategy in any case), there are no restrictions on whom the voter can name as his last choice in the next round.
Minimax:
To determine whether minimax is vulnerable to strategic manipulation on behalf of some candidate , I begin by finding the nonstrategic pairwise matrix , the corresponding minimax scores , and the value , which is defined as 's entry in . Formally, , ,
Because strategic voters can do nothing to reduce , they must arrange for all of the other candidates to have higher (worse) scores in order to elect . This means that each of the other candidates needs to have a certain number of votes against him in at least one pairwise contest. As long as this is the case, it doesn't matter what happens in the other pairwise contests, so there are only ‗beats' that we need to focus on.
I proceed by giving separate consideration to each of several possible ‗defeat profiles', which,
for each candidate other than , names another candidate who will give him a pairwise beat stronger
than . An exhaustive list of these is given by the array; tells us the candidate who is supposed to beat candidate , given profile , when the strategist candidate is . will sometimes list as the candidate doing the beating, but it will not require any candidate to beat (because this never helps to win), so when . For example, when , , where is the row dimension, is the column dimension, and is the matrix dimension.
Given a strategist candidate , and given a defeat profile , I create a ‗need' matrix , such that tells us how many votes the strategists need to add to 's side of the vs. pairwise contest, once the non-strategists' votes have already been taken into account. Formally, if , then ; otherwise, .
If voters weren't required to submit transitive rankings (e.g. if someone could cast a vote characterized by , , and ), then the number of strategists needed would simply be the largest value in . However, I do assume that voters must submit transitive rankings, and so I need to do a few more calculations. In short, to complete a ‗loop' that is formed in with beats, whose entries in sum to , the number of strategists needed is given by the greatest of these entries, or by , whichever is larger. (For example, , , and forms a loop with three beats, and the number of strategists needed to ensure the defeat of all three candidates in the loop is .)
, which is the number of strategists needed to ensure that can be given a defeat of the necessary magnitude, is determined by this formula if is in such a loop, and is otherwise simply 's nonzero entry in the matrix. If the number of strategists is greater than or equal to the maximum of the vector, for any defeat profile , then the result is manipulable by supporters of ; otherwise, it is not.
4.1.8. Borda: , , , and are calculated as above. Then, gives the Borda scores from non-strategic voters, and gives the minimum Borda score of , which strategists can't reduce. The strategists' goal is to form their own ‗strategic pairwise matrix' , such that is the winner according to the combined pairwise matrix , which requires that .
In short, the method of searching for a successful is as follows. begins as a matrix of zeros, and then is updated so that . (As is updated, is updated accordingly.)
If there are any ‗covered' candidates such that , the strategists ‗lift' them,
i.e. rank them between and the remaining candidates. (Thus, , for all candidates who are not yet lifted.) If this causes other candidates to be covered in turn, then they are lifted as well, though they are still ranked behind candidates who were lifted earlier.
If the iteration of this process leads to every candidate being covered, then . Otherwise, strategic voters are committed, one at a time, to ranking the remaining uncovered candidates as tied for last choice. (I assume that if voters give equal rankings to two or more candidates, then their votes are cast as the average of all strict rankings that can be formed by resolving expressed indifferencesfor example, an vote is treated as one half of a vote, and one half of a vote.) If and when this process causes additional candidates to be covered, then they are lifted as well, by the strategists who haven't yet committed to ranking them as tied for last.
This process continues until all candidates other than are covered, in which case , or until the supply of strategists is exhausted, in which case .
How often can simple strategies succeed? (analysis V2)
Compromising and burying together:
We have seen that some strategies are highly complex, and require both precise knowledge of other voters' preferences and precise coordination to be successful. Thus, as a complement to the primary analysis, it might be interesting to know how often each method is vulnerable to simpler voting strategies.
This analysis works as follows: For each method, I begin by finding the sincere winner, .
Then, for all other candidates , I check to see whether would win if the voters were to simultaneously bury and compromise in favor of . That is, I suppose that the voters give the best possible ranking or rating to , and the worst possible ranking or rating to . Certainly there may be other ideas about what a ‗simple' strategy might entail, but this is one of the more obvious ones, it has the advantage of being applicable to all of the voting methods we're examining, and as we'll see below, it can succeed in most of the cases in which strategy is possible.
Compromising:
For each voting rule, in each example, I first find the sincere winner, .
Then, for all other candidates , I check to see whether would win if the voters were to change their votes to give the best possible ranking or rating.
Burying:
For each voting rule, in each example, I first find the sincere winner, . Then, for all other candidates , I check to see whether would win if the voters were to change their votes to give the worst possible ranking or rating.
Strategic nomination simulation design
In order to provide a relative measure of how frequently different voting methods will have incentives for strategic nomination, I start with the assumption that there are candidates who are in the race by default, and candidates who are out of the race by default, but who would be prepared to enter it. (Thus, there are candidates overall.)
The by matrix of voter utilities over candidates is generated as before, using the spatial model. In addition to this, I generate a by matrix , such that (the additive inverse of the Euclidean distance) gives the utility that candidate experiences if candidate wins (and vice versa). This definition of implies that all candidates prefer their own election to the election of any other candidate. I focus on the spatial model because it gives us the most natural means of calculating candidates' preferences over other candidates.
Strategic nomination incentive for individual candidates (analysis N1):
Starting from the default set of ‗in' candidates and ‗out' candidates, I ask whether any individual candidate can get a result that he prefers by either leaving the race or by entering it. If so, I record this as an example of a strategic nomination incentive, except in the case in which a candidate enters the race and wins. I record incentives to quit the race separately from incentives to enter the race.
Strategic nomination incentive for groups of candidates (analysis N2):
Starting again from the default ballot, I ask whether any groups of candidates could conspire to simultaneously change their status (either all from in to out, or all from out to in) so that the result changes to one that they all prefer. Again, I don't record it as strategic nomination when one of the status-changing candidates enters the race and wins it. Because ‗groups' of one candidate are allowed in N2, N1 vulnerability implies N2 vulnerability.
Strategic voting results
General voting strategy analysis
Tables 1-3 and figures 1-3 give the results of the general voting strategy analysis using the spatial model, the impartial culture model, and the ANES data set. Each data point indicates the share of trials in which a group of voters can change the result to all of its members' mutual benefit by voting insincerely, using a given voting rule, and a given specification. I use 10,000 trials for each (non-ANES) data point, which causes the margin of error to be .0098 or less, with 95%
confidence. 21
Using the spatial model, the ANES data, and the impartial culture model with relatively few voters, there is a clear stratification between Hare and runoff, which are vulnerable to manipulation with low frequency, minimax and plurality, which are vulnerable to manipulation with moderate frequency, and approval, Borda, range, and Coombs, which are vulnerable to manipulation with high frequency. Within these groups, Hare is almost always better than runoff, and minimax is almost always better than plurality.
In the impartial culture model, when the number of voters is large, most of the eight methods are vulnerable approximately 100% of the time, but Hare and runoff are not. The manipulability of runoff is not close to 100% when , but it is close to 100% when . The manipulability of
Hare is not close to 100% for any . Propositions 10-12 below provide some intuition for these results. Changing the number of voters has much less of an impact in the spatial model, as
shown in table 4.
These results are broadly consistent with the existing literature on coalitional manipulation. For example, out of plurality, Borda, Hare, and Coombs, Chamberlin (1985) finds that Borda is most manipulable, and Hare is least manipulable, in both the impartial culture model and in a spatial 21 A margin of error of ±.0098 is the upper bound, which applies when the true probability is exactly one half. I further reduce the random error in the difference between the scores that the various voting methods receive by using the same set of randomly generated elections for each method.
model. Chamberlin also finds that all of the methods other than Hare are manipulable in the impartial culture model in 100% of trials, given . Lepelley and Mbih (1994) use an impartial anonymous culture (IAC) model, 22 and find the following ordering of methods from least to most manipulable: Hare, plurality, Coombs. Also using an IAC model, Favardin and Lepelley (2006) find the ordering Hare, runoff, minimax, plurality, Coombs, Borda (in what they call case 3, which is closest to the analysis here). Tideman (2006) uses a data set consisting of 87 elections, and finds the ordering Hare, minimax, runoff, plurality, Borda, range, approval. (This is demonstrated in proposition 5.) Plurality is the most vulnerable to compromising in all specifications (propositions 7 and 8 show that it is dominated by both Hare and runoff in this respect), and approval, range, and Borda are consistently more vulnerable than Hare and runoff. 
Analytical results
Notation: Let an overscore denote that a variable is defined with respect to voters' sincere preferences; for example, the sincere ranking matrix is , the sincere pairwise matrix is , and so on.
Burying strategy
Proposition 1: Plurality is immune to the burying strategy.
Proof: If voter prefers candidate to the sincere winner , then 's sincere ranking will not place first, which means that will gain zero points from 's sincere ballot. If were to attempt to use a burying strategy against , this would entail giving a worse ranking, , but because both of these rankings give zero points to , the change can't affect the outcome of the election. ■ Proposition 2: Runoff is immune to the burying strategy.
Proof: If voter prefers to , then 's sincere first-round vote will not be for . Therefore, can't affect whether or not makes it to the second round by burying . If and are both in the second round, then 's sincere second-round vote will not be for . Therefore, can't help to get elected by burying . ■ Proposition 3: Hare is immune to the burying strategy.
Proof: If voter prefers to , then will be ahead of in 's sincere rankings, .
may give a still-worse ranking, , but since no ranks behind will be counted unless is eliminated, this can't improve 's chances of winning. ■ Note: Minimax, Borda, approval, range, runoff, and Coombs are vulnerable to the burying strategy.
Compromising strategy
Proposition 4: Coombs is immune to the compromising strategy.
may give a still-better ranking, , but this can't affect the outcome of the race until after is eliminated. Therefore, the strategy can't have an effect until after has been eliminated, and will not be eliminated until the strategy has an effect. Therefore, the strategy can't work. (This is logically similar to proposition 3 in reverse.) ■
Note:
The ‗anti-plurality' system, which elects the candidate with the fewest last choice votes, is another method that is immune to compromising. Plurality, runoff, Hare, minimax, Borda, approval, and range are all vulnerable to compromising.
Proposition 5: If there is a sincere Condorcet winner, Minimax is not vulnerable to the compromising strategy.
Proof: If voter prefers to , then will be ahead of in 's sincere rankings, which means that the entry in 's sincere individual pairwise matrix will be 1. Formally,
. If voter gives a still-better ranking, this will not change , because 's ordering will be unchanged; nor will it change any other , because isn't moving in 's ranking relative to any other candidate. Formally, , which implies that .
Because is the sincere Condorcet winner, . Combining this with the above, , which implies that is still the Condorcet winner and therefore the minimax winner. ■ Proposition 6: Plurality, runoff, Hare, and minimax are vulnerable to the compromising strategy when there is a sincere majority rule cycle.
Proof: If there is a sincere majority rule cycle, then for any given sincere winner , there will be some alternative candidate such that a majority prefers to the sincere winner . Formally, . If all voters rank as their first choice, then will be the winner in plurality, runoff, Hare, and minimax. ■ Discussion: From propositions 5 and 6, we see that, in the absence of pairwise ties (which are unlikely in large elections), Plurality, runoff, and Hare are vulnerable to compromising whenever minimax is vulnerable to compromising, but minimax is not necessarily vulnerable to compromising when plurality, Hare, or runoff is vulnerable to compromising.
Proposition 7: If plurality isn't vulnerable to compromising, then runoff isn't vulnerable to compromising.
Proof: If plurality isn't vulnerable to compromising, then the number of voters whose sincere first choice is the plurality winner must be greater than the number of voters who prefer any alternative candidate to . Formally, . Since , must have the most votes, and must advance to the second round of a runoff election, given sincerity. Since by definition of and , implies that ; that is, must be a Condorcet winner. Therefore, wins the second round (and the election) given sincere voting.
If voters compromise in favor of a candidate , since , will still have the most votes, which means that will still advance into the second round. If advances into the second round as well, the second round still amounts to a pairwise comparison between and ; because is a Condorcet winner, will win the runoff. ■
Proposition 8: If plurality isn't vulnerable to compromising, then Hare isn't vulnerable to
compromising.
Proof: If plurality isn't vulnerable to compromising, then the number of voters whose sincere first choice is the plurality winner must be greater than the number of voters who prefer any alternative candidate to . Formally, . Given sincere voting, in any given round of counting, any vote counting for any candidate must come from a voter who prefers to .
Therefore, because , and because votes listing as the top choice will be counted for in every round as long as is not eliminated, the number of votes counting for in any given round must be less than the number of votes counting for . Therefore, can't be eliminated in any round, so will be the sincere winner in Hare.
Given a compromising strategy on behalf of , the logic above will still hold. That is, in any round in which has not been eliminated, any vote held by any candidate must come from a voter who prefers ; if voters are compromising in favor of , then only voters will be strategists, and otherwise, the ordering will be reported sincerely. Therefore, will still have the most votes in every round of counting, and will still be the winner in Hare. ■
Discussion:
With regard to resistance to the compromising strategy, we see from propositions 7 and 8 that runoff and Hare dominate plurality, and we see from propositions 5 and 6 that all three of these are all but entirely dominated by minimax.
General voting strategy
Proposition 9: If the sincere Condorcet winner is also the sincere first choice of more than one third of the voters, then both Hare and runoff will elect and be non-manipulable.
Runoff: Because is the first choice of more than one third of the voters, no group of strategists will be able to cause his elimination in the first round, because it's impossible for two other candidates to have more than one third of the votes. Because is the Condorcet winner, no candidate will be able to defeat him in the runoff.
Hare: As in runoff, a candidate with more than first choice votes will not be eliminated before the last round, because each of the prior rounds will include three or more candidates, and because none of the voters whose sincere first choice is will have an incentive to defect on behalf of an alternative candidate . Because the last round is equivalent to a pairwise comparison, and because is the Condorcet winner, will win. ■ Note: The property described in proposition 9 is not shared by plurality, minimax, Borda, Coombs, approval, or range. candidates, none of these voters will be interested in participating in a strategy on behalf of any non-eliminated candidate . Therefore, strategic incursion against can't succeed. ■
Discussion:
The purpose of propositions 10 through 12 is to shed some light on a dynamic observed in the impartial culture simulation results: Given , Hare is the only one of my eight voting methods that doesn't converge towards 100% manipulability as the number of voters gets large.
Given
, this property is shared by the runoff system. When is large in an impartial culture model, each preference order appears in approximately equal proportion; therefore, the winner's margin of victory tends to be very small relative to the number of voters who prefer an alternative candidate to the sincere winner. These features are captured in the ‗almost symmetrical preferences'
scenario that provides the basis for these propositions. , and for all other , . Therefore, is the sincere winner.
Suppose, however, that all of the voters who prefer vote .
Then, we still have , but now, , and . Therefore, there will be a majority rule cycle, but the defeat against will be the weakest, so will win.
Borda: From the sincere pairwise matrix described above, we calculate that the sincere Borda score for each candidate is , and the sincere winner is .
Suppose, however, that all of the voters who prefer vote . The resulting pairwise matrix will be , and the resulting Borda scores will be , , and , . Therefore, the new winner will be .
Coombs:
Given sincere voting, each candidate will have the same number of last choice votes in each round of counting, except for the one symmetry-breaking vote, which will cause the elimination order to be , so that is the winner. However, if the voters who prefer change their votes so that is ranked last, but the rankings are otherwise the same, will be eliminated in the first round (with last choice votes, which is greater than 's total of last choice votes), and then the remaining eliminations will occur in their original order, leaving as the winner. ■ Proposition 12: Given the runoff system, with candidates , if there are voters with each possible preference ordering, plus one additional voter with an preference ordering, will be the winner. If , the result will not be manipulable, but if , the result will be manipulable.
Case 1, :
Because is the sincere Condorcet winner, and because has more than votes, is the sincere winner, and the result is non-manipulable, by proposition 9 above. Proof: Assume that the plurality rule asks voters to rank the candidates in order of preference, and then chooses the candidate with the most first choice rankings. (Or, in the case of a tie, that it is broken lexicographically, such that is most favored by the tiebreaker, and is least favored.)
Assume that if voters give equal rankings to two or more candidates, then their votes are cast as the average of all strict rankings that can be formed by resolving expressed indifferences.
If votes are sincere, then each will receive votes, and will receive votes. Therefore, wins if and only if , or equivalently, . Therefore, in this type of situation, having more candidates is disadvantageous for the group. ■ Proposition 21: Given the Borda rule, if the electorate consists of voters whose preferences are , and voters whose preferences are , and votes are sincere, will win if and only if .
Proof: Make the same assumptions as above. has candidates ranked above him on ballots, so his Borda score is . has one candidate ( ) ranked above him on ballots, so his Borda score is . Therefore, wins if and only if , or equivalently, . Therefore, in this type of situation, having more candidates is advantageous for the group. ■ Proposition 22: Given the Coombs rule, if the electorate consists of voters whose preferences are , and voters whose preferences are , and votes are sincere, will win if and only if .
Proof: Make the same assumptions as above. For any value of , voters will rank in last place, and, given the treatment of equally-ranked candidates described above, voters will effectively rank in last place, where is any candidate in the group. Therefore, will avoid first-round elimination if and only if , or equivalently, if . If is not eliminated in the first round, then will not be eliminated in any subsequent round, because 's last choice vote total will remain at , while the last choice vote total for each will increase to , , and so on, until all of the 's have been eliminated. Therefore, in this type of situation, having more candidates is advantageous for the group. ■ Note: Given Hare or minimax, and the scenarios described in propositions 20-22, wins if and only if .
Discussion: Propositions 20 through 22 explore strategic nomination using simple two-group scenarios. They suggest that plurality should be particularly vulnerable to strategic entry, and that Borda and Coombs should be particularly vulnerable to strategic exit. This is consistent with the simulation results.
Conclusion
Summary of simulation results
Table 19 below summarizes the results presented in sections 6 and 7, by qualitatively characterizing the relative vulnerability of each method to each type of strategic manipulation. 
General discussion
With regard to strategic voting, there is a clear stratification between frequently-manipulable methods such as range, Coombs, Borda, and approval, moderately-manipulable methods such as plurality and minimax, and infrequently-manipulable methods such as Hare and runoff: this pattern emerges in nearly all specifications, regardless of the data generating process that is used. Plurality is clearly most vulnerable to compromising and strategic exit, while Coombs, range, and approval are most vulnerable to burying, and Borda is most vulnerable to strategic entry. If there is no strategic voting, then we would expect approval, range, and minimax to have very infrequent strategic nomination incentives, though this might not hold if candidates take the possibility of strategic voting into account during the nomination stage. Thus, an analysis that combines strategic nomination and strategic voting into a two-stage game would be an interesting topic for further study.
Among the eight methods that are covered here, Hare has the advantage of being the least frequently vulnerable to strategic voting, but minimax has an advantage in resistance to strategic nomination, particularly strategic exit. 23
Aside from counting the raw frequency with which strategic manipulation is possible, there are many other interesting questions to be explored, such as the likelihood that manipulation will actually occur, and the effect on social welfare if manipulation is successful. These questions require us to make more assumptions to generate results, but they are nonetheless worth asking, and they have already formed the basis for much interesting research in this area.
A broad lesson from this paper is that all voting rules are vulnerable to strategic manipulation in some non-insignificant fraction of elections. Looking at the bottom of table 5, we see that even Hare is vulnerable to strategic voting in a majority of cases if the number of candidates is sufficiently large. Proportional representation may provide a partial solution to this predicament. For example, Tullock (1967) describes a system in which anyone who wishes to can serve as a representative, and in which each representative's voting weight is determined by the number of people who vote for them, whether this number is one, or several million. Since this system would allow all voters to have their first choice of representative, there is arguably no incentive for strategic voting over candidates, though once elected, representatives may still engage in strategic voting over issues, using whatever parliamentary rules they have established. As for the question of which parliamentary rules are least susceptible to manipulation, I leave this for future study.
